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Constitutivism about reasons begins with the idea what we have reason to believe or 
do is grounded in facts about our nature as acting, believing, and reasoning beings. 
Thus, constitutivism claims that our nature as rational agents takes explanatory 
priority over facts about our reasons. We have the reasons we do because we are 
rational agents of  a certain sort. 
Such a view has seemed attractive to many.   But in developing it, we immediately face 2
a difficult question. Like anything else, I may be accurately thought of  in many ways. 
And many of  these descriptions involve an implicit conception of  my proper activity 
or function. In other words, to use Thomson's terminology, I fall under a wide variety 
of  different "goodness fixing kinds".  Moreover, many of  these kinds might 3
reasonably be thought of  as providing us with a conception of  myself  as a rational 
agent. And any of  these might in principle be used as the foundation for a 
constitutivist account of  my reasons. For example, we might begin here with a 
minimal conception of  rational agency of  the sort familiar from "Humean" accounts 
of  rationality.  Or we might begin with a more expansive conception of  rationality of  4
the sort characteristic of  Kantian work on these issues.  Or we might begin with the 5
form of  rational agency that is particular to human beings in the manner characteristic 
of  neo-Aristotelian views.  6
All of  these have some plausibility, but we cannot say that all of  them are relevant in 
the same way to what I have reason to do. For these descriptions often involve 
conflicting conceptions of  my proper function or activity. And, as such, they are likely 
to generate competing accounts of  what I have reason to do. Thus, in developing a 
constitutivist account, we need to determine which characterization of  my nature 
grounds my reasons. 
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Nor it is obvious that non-normative inquiry into metaphysics can settle these 
questions. For example, while I can be described in many ways, perhaps only one of  
these accurately characterizes my fundamental essence as an acting thing. And perhaps 
it is this description that we should focus on when developing a constitutivist account 
of  my reasons. But it is not obvious that a characterization of  me - solely in virtue of  
being metaphysically fundamental - represents the level of  description that determines 
what I have reason to do. And it might be that we can only know my essence as an 
acting thing via consideration of  what my reasons for action are. For example, 
following Kant, perhaps we can become aware of  our essence as agents only through 
a prior knowledge of  what we ought to do. If  so, then only through thinking about 
foundational questions in metaethics will I be able to know my essence as a rational 
agent. 
For similar reasons, we shouldn’t assume that the constitutivist must begin with the 
conception of  agency or intentional action that is the focus of  contemporary work in 
the philosophy of  action.  For example, the conception of  rational agency that is 7
relevant to constitutivism may involve more than the mere capacity to “act 
intentionally” in the ordinary English sense of  these words. Indeed, as discussed 
below, I think that the proper starting point of  the constitutivist project is best 
described - not as conception of  agency per se - but rather as a general conception of  
rationality, of  which rational agency is one form. 
1. Reflection and the Concept of  a Reason 
So how should the constitutivist determine the description of  rational agency that is 
relevant to her project? A tempting thought, made famous by Korsgaard's discussion 
in The Sources of  Normativity, is that we can answer this question by considering the 
sort of  creatures for whom questions about reasons arise in the first place.  As 8
Korsgaard somewhat metaphorically puts this point, we can think of  terms like 
"reason" as picking out solutions to certain sorts of  normative problems - problems 
that arise only for creatures of  a particular sort. If  so, then to understand what 
reasons are, we should begin by asking ourselves what it is to solve these problems 
well. And to understand this, for the constitutivist at least, we need to understand what 
it is to be such a creature. 
Korsgaard describes such beings as follows: 
Normative concepts exist because human beings have normative problems. 
And we have normative problems because we are self-conscious rational 
animals, capable of  reflection about what we ought to believe and to do. That 
is why the normative question can be raised in the first place … (46-47) 
Korsgaard expands on this idea as follows: 
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But the human mind is self-conscious in the sense that it is essentially 
reflective. ... And this sets us a problem no other animal has. It is the problem 
of  the normative. For our capacity to turn our attention on to our own mental 
activities is also a capacity to distance ourselves from them, and to call them 
into question. I perceive, and I find myself  with a powerful impulse to believe. 
But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain 
distance. Now the impulse doesn't dominate me and now I have a problem. 
Shall I believe? Is this perception really a reason to believe? I desire and I find 
myself  with a powerful impulse to act. But I back up and bring that impulse 
into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse doesn't 
dominate me and now I have a problem. Shall I act? Is this desire really a reason 
to act? The reflective mind cannot settle for perception and desire, not just as 
such. It needs a reason. Otherwise, at least as long as it reflects, it cannot 
commit itself  or go forward. (92-94) 
Thus, for Korsgaard, the need for the concept of  a reason arises because we are 
capable of  self-conscious reflection, which allows us to take a step back from our 
perceptions, desires, and other attitudes and ask questions about whether and why we 
should accept those attitudes. 
There is, I think, something right about this picture of  how the need for the concept 
of  a reason emerges: namely, that its natural home is in a certain sort of  reflective 
deliberation.  It is important to stress that to say this is not to make the over-9
intellectualist claim that the only manifestations of  rationality involve conscious 
reflection or deliberation. Rather, the point here is about the concept of  a reason. In 
particular, one can accept that the need for this concept emerges only in reflective 
contexts, while also claiming that the sort of  responsiveness to reasons which is 
characteristic of  rational thought is found in many less reflective contexts.  10
Thus, I think that Korsgaard’s starting point is far less intellectualist than it might 
seem, although of  course it will be too intellectualist for some.  But there is also 11
something surprising about Korsgaard's description of  the sort of  reflection at work 
here. As Korsgaard describes it, in engaging in this sort of  reflection, we normally 
take a step back from our perceptions and desires and make those perceptions and desires 
the object of  reflective inquiry. In other words, in such reflection, we ask, of  the 
various elements of  our state of  mind, whether these elements stand up to reflective 
scrutiny. 
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In this way, as a number of  critics have noted, Korsgaard’s account seems to 
mischaracterize the phenomenology typical of  such reflective episodes.  Normally in 12
such cases, far from turning inward, our attention remains focused outward on the 
world. In other words, in such reflection we remain focused on the question of  what 
is true or what is to be done - and not on whether our attitudes are correct or 
incorrect.  13
This may seem a minor point, but Korsgaard's understanding of  reflection resonates 
through her view. For Korsgaard, the aim that is constitutive of  agency is to unify 
one's self  - or, in other words, to achieve genuine autonomous agency. This 
conception of  the aim of  agency makes perfect sense if  the sort of  reflection at issue 
here is paradigmatically reflection on the status and relations of  our own attitudes. 
For in that case, what will become salient to us through such reflection are the ways in 
which our attitudes and actions are in conflict with one another. Thus, such reflection 
will generate a consciousness of  our own lack of  unity. Given this, it is natural to 
think of  the primary challenge that such reflection poses in terms of  overcoming this 
disunity, in very much the manner Korsgaard describes. 
But if  we think of  rational reflection in a more object-directed or world-directed way, 
this will not seem so obvious. For the primary task that such object-directed reflection 
poses is the task of  knowing or understanding what is the case or what is to be done. 
And, at least at first glance, this is not obviously the same as the task of  unifying one's 
own mental states or attitudes as such. 
In this way, Korsgaard's conception of  the manner in which reflection gives rise to 
questions about reasons makes it natural for her to focus on the task of  achieving a 
certain sort of  subjective or agential unity. But if  we conceive of  such reflection in a 
more object-directed fashion, our attention will focus somewhere else: namely, the 
task of  achieving knowledge or understanding of  what is and what is to be done. In 
this way, one’s understanding of  the sort of  reflection that is relevant here naturally 
informs one’s view of  the aim of  rational agency.  14
Moreover, once we conceive of  rational agency in terms of  the aim of  achieving an 
understanding of  what is to be done, it becomes natural to think of  rational agency as 
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one manifestation of  a more general capacity for both theoretical and practical 
understanding. I will say more about this shortly. But for now, I just want to note that 
this makes it attractive to think of  the constitutivist project - not as beginning with a 
notion of  agency in particular - but rather, as beginning with a general notion of  
rationality, of  which rational agency is one form.  
That having been said, I do not mean to deny that there is a constitutive connection 
between rationality and autonomy or subjective unity. Indeed, to jump ahead for a 
moment, on my view, rationality does have a constitutive connection with a certain 
sort of  autonomy. But this is because this sort of  autonomy is the "subject-directed" 
analogue of  the sort of  "object-directed" understanding at which rationality primarily 
aims. Thus, in the end, I agree with much of  what Korsgaard says about these issues -
albeit in a somewhat different context than she would accept. 
My aim in this essay is to explore this sort of  “understanding-first” constitutivism. To 
do so, I'll proceed as follows. First, I'll discuss how the nature of  rational reflection 
supports a conception of  rationality as the capacity for a certain sort of  
understanding. Then, I'll explain why this general capacity has both a theoretical and a 
practical manifestation, by discussing the theoretical and practical forms that such 
understanding can take. In this section, I’ll also address some worries about the 
circularity of  this account. With that in mind, I'll turn to the forms of  reasoning that 
are essential to rationality in this sense. In particular, I'll sketch how this account of  
rationality might be used to explain (i) the rationality of  forms of  explanatory 
reasoning and (ii) a responsiveness to the views of  others. Finally, I will return to the 
relationship between understanding-first and autonomy-first constitutivism. 
2. Rationality and Understanding 
Let’s begin with the conception of  rationality that sits at the heart of  this form of  
constitutivism. Above I followed Korsgaard by taking the sort of  reflection within 
which questions about reasons arises as a Leitfaden for thinking about the kind of  
rationality that is constitutively connected with reasons. The hope here is that, by 
doing so, we can isolate the conception of  rationality of  interest to the constitutivist 
by considering the capacities and activities involved in bringing such reflection to a 
successful conclusion. For if  the "reasons problem" arises in course of  such 
reflection, then to understand the proper "solution" to this problem, we must 
understand what it is to bring such reflection successfully to an end. 
Thus, we can think of  rationality in the sense of  interest to us in terms of  the 
capacity that is required to successfully engage in this sort of  reflection.  To think of  15
rationality in this way is to adopt a broadly virtue-theoretical understanding of  
rationality in terms of  the proper functioning of  a capacity. Such capacities are 
characterized by a distinctive aim or function.  As a result, rationality will be 16
associated with certain standards of  "goodness" which can be derived from this 
characteristic activity or function. In this way, the idea of  rationality as a capacity 
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generates both a "capacity conception" of  rationality and an "evaluative conception" 
of  what it is for this capacity to function well.  17
But what is it for this capacity to function well? As we just discussed, reflection on the 
phenomenology of  rational reflection suggests that this function is primarily 
concerned with achieving theoretical or practical understanding, as opposed to 
autonomy or self-unification. But we need to be cautious in inferring facts about the 
constitutive function of  rational reflection from its phenomenology.  After all, it 18
might well be that the nature of  rational reflection guides our attention away from its 
constitutive function.  
Nonetheless, it is important to remember that the phenomenology of  rational 
reflection is not merely a matter of  where such reflection directs our attention. 
Rather, the phenomenology of  rational reflection involves an implicit understanding 
of its point. Of  course, this aspect of  the phenomenology of  reflection might be 
misleading. But nonetheless it is reasonable to treat it as a defeasible starting point in 
considering these questions. 
To flesh out this point, consider what it is for this sort of  reflection to come to a fully 
successful conclusion. Such reflection as primarily concerned with two questions, one 
theoretical and one practical: namely, the question of  whether P, and the question of  
whether to A. It is these sorts of  questions that theoretical and practical reflection 
seems to aim at answering, at least in the first instance. 
This suggests an initial answer to our question. For given that rational reflection is 
concerned with such questions, isn't it obvious that it will reach a successful 
conclusion just in case it arrives at the correct answers to them? Given this, it seems 
natural to think  that the function or aim of  rational reflection is to help us reach 
correct conclusions about these questions. More precisely, on this view, the function 
of  theoretical rationality would be to produce true beliefs. And the function of  
practical rationality would be to produce correct intentions or actions, however this 
notion of  "correctness" is understood. 
Especially in the practical domain, such a view might be made precise in a variety of  
ways - corresponding to different accounts of  the "practical correctness" that 
corresponds to "truth" in the case of  beliefs. But even if  we focus on the case of  
theoretical reflection, where things are simplest, I think this simple account provides 
us with an incomplete picture of  the function of  rational reflection. 
Of  course, theoretical reflection or inquiry will only reach a fully successful 
conclusion if  it produces accurate representation of  what is the case.  The question 19
is whether this is all that a fully successful conclusion to such reflection requires. I 
think it is clear that it is not. After all, we may form a true belief  for all sorts of  
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reasons and in all sorts of  ways. And such beliefs can, and often will, fall sort of  
valuable epistemic statuses such as knowledge or understanding. When they do, it 
seems that, while the rational reflection in question has come to a correct conclusion, it 
is less than fully successful. 
For example, philosophers often speak of  theoretical inquiry as successfully 
terminated by knowledge that. This already involves a more demanding conception of  
the aim of  rational reflection than truth. But, at least as it is often understood, it also 
leaves something essential out of  the picture. For the fully successful conclusion of  
rational reflection involves more than mere propositional knowledge, at least if  this is 
understood in a piecemeal fashion. In particular, while knowledge that P may settle 
the question whether P in some sense, it need not terminate inquiry into P more 
generally. For example, even if  I know that P, it may still be the case that I have no 
idea why or how P is true. Thus, I may not be able to make sense of  P. If  this is the 
case, I will have good reason to prolong my inquiry into P - namely, that I fall short 
of  full understanding of  it.  20
In other words, inquiry is concerned, not just with knowing that, but also with 
knowing how, knowing why, knowing which, knowing what, and so on. For example, 
if  I am unable to cite any reasons why P is true, I will be unable to explain why my 
view is the correct one. And if  I am unable to use these reasons as my grounds for 
believing P, I will have failed to fully integrate this belief  into my general 
understanding of  the world.  In these cases, there is a clear sense in which rational 21
reflection about P is incomplete. For while I may know that P, I will be unable to 
satisfy the request for reasons that arises in the context of  rational reflection. 
Thus, while there is a close connection between understanding and knowledge, 
understanding involves more than mere piecemeal knowledge that. Rather, in the 
sense I am interested in, understanding is something more like a properly structured 
knowledge of  that, how, why, which, etc.  One consequence of  this is that, while knowledge 22
is often thought of  as something one either has or lacks, understanding is the sort of  
thing that generally comes in degrees. For one’s level of  understanding will increase 
with the degree to which one has the required pieces of  knowledge in the right 
relations. 
This distinction between piecemeal propositional knowledge and genuine 
understanding is a familiar one. For example, understanding biology involves more 
than knowing a variety of  disconnected biological facts. It also requires that I can 
make sense of  these facts. And this requires, not just various pieces of  knowledge 
that, but also knowledge how and why and so forth. For this provides one’s 
understanding of  biology with the structure that is characteristic of  understanding. 
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Moreover, this phenomenon is easy to locate in the practical domain as well. For 
example, practical understanding of  what is to be done requires more than merely 
intending to do the right thing. It also requires that one can make sense of  why this is 
to be done and how. Indeed, much of  ordinary instrumental reasoning can be 
understood as aiming at a deeper and more systematic understanding of  the thing to 
do. In this way, even very basic forms of  practical reasoning can be seen to 
contributing to practical understanding - for example, by giving the agent knowledge 
that she is doing A in order to do B.  
This is closely connected with the idea that it is this sort of  reflection that gives rise to 
the need for the concept of  a reason. For the function of  the concept of  a reason is 
not simply to improve the correctness of  our answers to such questions. Rather, this 
concept also allows us to grasp the explanatory connections between different 
questions and answers. Thus, the fact that rational reflection gives rise to this concept 
indicates that the fully successful conclusion of  such reflection involves more than 
piecemeal knowledge that. Rather, such reflection is only fully successful when we 
possess the sort of  understanding that allows us to make sense of  our answers to the 
questions we are considering. 
In this way, the nature of  rational reflection supports the conclusion that such 
reflection is only fully successful insofar as it leads to genuine understanding. And 
given its tight connection with the conditions under which rational reflection is fully 
successful, I believe this conception of  understanding is ideally suited to characterize 
the function of  rationality in the sense of  interest to us here. Moreover, as I explain 
below, this conception of  rationality should also be attractive to a constitutivist 
because it provides us with extra resources for making sense of  reasons that are 
difficult to explain on more restricted conceptions of  rationality. But before 
addressing this issue, I want to say a bit more about this conception of  rationality and 
the correlated notion of  understanding - focusing on its ability to provide us with a 
unified understanding of  theoretical and practical rationality as two manifestations of  
a general capacity for understanding. 
3. Theoretical and Practical Rationality 
To do so, we need to consider what distinguishes theoretical from practical rationality. 
On this view, we can understand these forms of  rationality in terms of  the general 
capacity for rationality insofar as it is manifested by theoretical or practical thought. 
So the requirements of  epistemic and practical rationality in particular will follow from 
this general conception of  rationality when it is combined with the particular functions 
of  theoretical or practical thought. In other words, both theoretical and practical 
thought have the function characteristic of  rational thought in general - namely, that 
of  generating understanding. But theoretical and practical thought are distinguished 
from by the particular sort of  understanding it is their function to produce.   23
But how should we distinguish these forms of  understanding? There are at least three 
main answers to this question. First, there is the idea that theoretical understanding is 
distinguished from practical understanding in terms of  the different standards of  
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correctness that are constitutive of  the understanding in question.  Second, there is the 24
idea that theoretical and practical reasoning aim to answer importantly different sorts 
of  questions.  And third, there is the idea that basic theoretical/practical distinction 25
involves the explanatory relationship between one's understanding and what is 
understood - so that theoretical understanding is understanding that is grounded in its 
object’s existence in some sense, while practical understanding has the opposite 
relationship to its object. 
I don't think these should necessarily be seen as incompatible answers to our 
question. Rather, a version of  all three of  these claims may be true.  But the 26
important point for us is simply that, whichever of  these views we adopt, we can 
understand the difference between theoretical and practical rationality in terms of  a 
more basic distinction between these forms of  understanding.  
To summarize, while remaining as neutral as possible between these three 
formulations, let's say that the distinctive function of  theoretical reason is to 
understand the way things are. Correspondingly, the distinctive function of  practical 
reason is to understand what to do - and thereby to shape the world through our 
understanding.  In making these claims, it is important not to confuse the distinctive 27
function of  a form of  thought with its standard of  correctness.  For example, while 28
the characteristic function of  practical thought seems to involve effective action in some 
way, the standard of  correctness for it will be the practical analogue of  the true - namely, 
what is to be done or what ought to be done.  29
This has important implications for the relationship between my view of  practical 
rationality and Velleman's form of  constitutivism. Although his view does conceive 
of  practical rationality in terms of  a certain sort of  autonomy, Velleman also takes 
this sort of  autonomy to be closely related to a sort of  understanding. Thus, like me, 
Velleman takes the function of  practical rationality to lie in a certain sort of  
understanding. The difference between us lies in how we understand the relevant sort 
of  understanding. For me, the understanding that is relevant to practical rationality is 
just the practical analogue of  theoretical understanding. So, just as theoretical 
rationality aims to understand what is, practical rationality aims to understand what is 
to be done. For Velleman, on the other hand, practical rationality aims at a certain sort 
of  folk-psychological understanding of  oneself as agent. Thus, on his view, the aim of  
practical reasoning and reflection is to produce actions that are intelligible to the agent 
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given his folk-psychological understanding of  himself.  In this way, for Velleman, the 30
understanding that is constitutive of  practical rationality is fundamentally self-directed 
and ultimately theoretical in character. 
Which of  these accounts should we prefer? Velleman's defense of  his view against 
objections is nuanced, so I do not mean to present a knockdown argument against it. 
But for reasons already mentioned, it seems to me that my view is closer to the 
ordinary first-personal understanding of  the point of  practical reasoning. For when I 
am reasoning about what to do, it does not seem to me that I am engaged in an 
activity that aims at achieving a better folk-psychological understanding of  myself. 
Of  course, such considerations are hardly decisive on their own. But they provide us 
with a prima facie case in favor of  my view. And I think that, at least for a Kantian, 
there are other reasons to prefer my account. Velleman's view treats the sort of  
understanding that is characteristic of  practical rationality as a subspecies of  
theoretical understanding - albeit one with a self-fulfilling character. This, contrary to 
Kant, gives theoretical rationality a sort of  priority over practical rationality. We can 
avoid this by viewing practical rationality as providing us with a sort of  practical 
understanding that cannot be reduced to a special instance of  theoretical 
understanding. Thus, if  our goal is to understand theoretical and practical rationality 
as two equally basic manifestations of  a general capacity for understanding, I think we 
can do better here. In other words, in this way, Velleman doesn’t seem to me to do full 
justice to the possibility of  genuinely practical reason. This, I think, would be Kant’s 
main concern about Velleman’s account. 
But what of  Velleman's motivations for characterizing practical rationality in the 
manner he does? In rejecting the sort of  view I've been defending, Velleman is 
motivated by the thought that such a view make it impossible for the constitutivist to 
explain reasons or values in terms of  the nature of  rationality or agency. For example, 
he writes: 
Whereas most philosophers think that the intelligibility of  an action derives 
from its appropriateness or rightness or goodness, real or perceived, I am going 
to argue that appropriateness or rightness or goodness derives from [folk 
psychological] intelligibility - which cannot then derive from such normative 
considerations on pain of  circularity. My reason for reversing the order of  
explanation is that I can thereby account for what is less clear, normativity, in 
terms of  what more clear, psychological explanation... (Velleman(2009), 27) 
This is an important point. But, for two reasons, I don't think it counts against 
understanding-first constitutivism, once it is properly understood. First, while my 
account does characterize the function of  practical rationality in terms of  a distinctive 
sort of  practical understanding, it need not conceive of  practical understanding in 
explicitly normative terms. Rather, it can conceive of  what is distinctive of  practical 
understanding in terms of  the relationship between such understanding and its object, 
or in terms of  the sorts of  questions it aims to answer, or simply as an understanding 
 Velleman(2009): "The relevant notion of  'making sense' is not normative: it's not about 30
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of  what is to be done. The last of  these possibilities is particularly important. For it 
indicates that we need not begin by characterizing practical understanding as involving 
an understanding of  the "good" or what "ought to be". Rather, we can also 
characterize it in broadly imperatival terms.  By doing so, we can capture what is 31
distinctive about practical understanding without characterizing practical 
understanding as an understanding of  normative facts. 
But, and this is the second point, even if  we do characterize practical understanding 
as a sort of  understanding of  such facts, this will not necessarily make the attempt to 
explain facts about what ought to be done in terms of  prior facts about rationality 
circular. For there is nothing circular in first characterizing practical rationality in 
terms of  certain thoughts involving the concept or mode of  presentation OUGHT or 
GOOD, and then using this characterization of  rationality to explain the reference 
and the truth-conditions of  these thoughts. This will be possible, for instance, 
provided that it is possible to characterize the nature of  ought-thoughts (on the level 
of  sense) by specifying the conditions for understanding them, and more specifically, 
the conditions for possessing the normative concepts they deploy. Such a 
characterization needn’t involve a characterization of  the reference of  these concepts. 
Instead, we might characterize these possession conditions via a characteristic role the 
concept plays in cognition and action. We can then use this characterization of  the 
possession conditions of  the concept as input into the determination of  the reference 
and truth conditions of  those ought thoughts. Such an approach is by no means 
trivial, but it is familiar enough from the discussion of  concepts whose truth-
conditions are determined by their proper use.  32
Thus, these circularity worries are no reason to reject a characterization of  practical 
rationality as aiming at an understanding of  what is to be done. Of  course, this does 
not rule out the possibility that fully realizing this function requires something like the 
sort of  self-understanding as agents that Velleman describes. Indeed, it seems to me 
that something like this is the case. But acknowledging this does not require us to 
reject a classical picture of  practical reasoning as aiming at understanding what is to 
be done. 
4. The Requirements of  Understanding 
The foregoing provides us with a general strategy for the constitutivist.  In the 
practical domain, this begins with a conception of  rationality and its success 
conditions, characterized in terms of  understanding what to do. The constitutivist 
strategy is, then, to derive facts about what we ought to do and the reasons we have 
from general constraints on understanding. To demonstrate the power of  this 
approach, I will briefly discuss two central ways in which the nature of  understanding 
places non-trivial constraints on the nature of  good reasoning, with the hope that this 
will help to demonstrate the power of  this approach. 
 See Schafer(2013). This is not far from the understanding of  practical thought developed by 31
expressivists like Gibbard(1992, 2003) and Blackburn(2000).
 For an example of  this sort of  strategy in a realist context, see Wedgwood(2007). For some 32
relevant background, see Peacocke(1992).
a. Explanatory Reasoning 
To do so, let’s begin with the significance of  explanatory reasoning for rationality, 
conceived of  as a capacity for understanding.  
As noted above, theoretical understanding of  some domain of  facts requires more 
than a scattered and piecemeal collection of  true beliefs. Rather, understanding 
requires a grasp of  the explanatory connections within that domain. For example, to 
understand physics, I must have some grasp of  the why particular physical facts 
follow from certain physical laws - and in doing so I must grasp the explanatory 
connections between the two. For only then will I be in a position to articulate why 
some physical fact is true.  And similarly, to really understand what is to be done, I 33
must have some implicit grasp of  why particular actions are to be done. For example, I 
may grasp that some action A is to be done as a way of  doing B. So here too, my 
intentions will only constitute genuine practical understanding if  they possess this sort 
of  explanatory unity. 
But in order for my beliefs or intentions to have this sort of  unity, they must be 
connected together in certain ways. That is, they must form a network of  inferences. 
And the inferences in question must go beyond encoding merely logical relations. 
Rather, in order to capture the explanatory links we are interested in, these inferences 
will often have to involve explanatory forms of  reasoning like inference to the best 
explanation.   34
For instance, part of  an explanatorily unified set of  beliefs is a grasp of  how 
explanatory connections are relevant to ways in which these beliefs ground each other. 
For example, if  I grasp an explanatory connection between events of  type A 
(explanans) and events of  type B (explanandum), then I will be disposed to make a 
defeasible inference from the existence of  an A-event to the existence of  a B-event. 
That is, I will be prepared to see belief  in one as a potential ground of  belief  in the 
other. And similarly, if  I believe that the best explanation of  events of  type B is 
normally the presence of  an event of  type A, I will be disposed to make a defeasible 
inference from the existence of  a B-event to the existence of  an A-event. In this way, 
part of  having an explanatorily unified set of  beliefs is ability to connect these beliefs 
together via various inferential relations. And these relations go beyond deductive 
inference to include various forms of  explanatory or ampliative inference. Thus, 
explanatorily unified understanding requires that one’s beliefs be taken to ground each 
other in a variety of  explanatorily significant ways. 
 As Grimm(2010) writes: "understanding is directed at a complex of  some kind - in 33
particular, at a complex with parts or elements that depend upon, and relate to, one another, 
and that the mind grasps or apprehends when it understands."
 For evidence of  this, we might consider cases in which one knows that something happens 34
because of  something else, but does not grasp how the one event could ground the other. For 
example, knowledge that P occurred because of  Q can be acquired through ordinary 
testimony - but this is often insufficient for one to fully understand this connection. See 
Hills(2015).
If  this is right, then genuine understanding requires that our attitudes are connected 
together by explanatory forms of  inference. For it is only insofar as this is true that 
we can truly be said to have internalized the explanatory relations that are relevant to 
understanding. In this way, the acceptance of  such patterns of  inference is partially 
constitutive of  understanding. Thus, the capacity to make such inferences is partially 
constitutive of  the capacity for understanding. And, of  course, making such 
inferences is also an excellent means of  improving our understanding.  
Now, there may be a variety of  inferential methods that are capable of  playing this 
role. So there may not be any particular form of  explanatory inference that is required 
here. But what is so constitutive is the use of  some sort of  inference that gives 
preference to more explanatory sets of  beliefs and intentions. Thus, if  the function of  
rationality is understanding, we can see why we are rationally required to use some 
form of  reasoning that privileges better explanations over worse.  And similarly, we 35
can see why the use of  such methods of  reasoning is generally more rational than 
forms of  reasoning that do not have this character. In this way, the idea that 
rationality is a capacity for understanding is well placed to explain the special rational 
status of  explanatory inference.  36
b. Understanding and Intersubjectivity 
This is important because explanatory inferences of  this sort play such a large role in 
our ordinary understanding of  good reasoning qua a proper responsiveness to 
reasons.  Thus, a plausible form of  constitutivism should begin with a conception of  37
rationality that is capable of  explaining why such inferences have a privileged rational 
status - in both the theoretical and practical domains. 
Something similar is true of  what we might call the "intersubjective dimensions" of  
rationality. For example, one way of  being properly responsive to reasons for belief  is 
to listen to the testimony of  others. And one way to be properly responsive to reasons 
for action is to be sensitive to the concerns of  others. Thus, a plausible form of  
constitutivism ought to begin with a conception of  rationality that can explain the 
rationality of  these patterns of  thought. 
 I discuss this in greater detail in Schafer(forthcoming).35
 These conclusions follow, even though understanding - like knowledge - is factive and so 36
requires correctness. Given this, it is true that a pattern of  inference will only tend to generate 
(say) theoretical understanding insofar as it is reliable. So these arguments provide us with no 
guarantee that use of  such methods will be provide us with understanding. But nonetheless, 
these arguments show that our only hope for achieving understanding is to use such methods. 
Thus, while use of  these methods is not the only necessary condition on achieving the aim of  
rationality, it is one such condition. And this explains why these methods should have a 
privileged rational status - at least insofar as a we lack positive evidence of  their unreliability.
 This is obvious in the theoretical sphere. And much the same is true of  practical reasoning. 37
For example, we often reject some desire as misleading about what is worth doing because it 
conflicts with our overall understanding of  what is to be done - even if  it does not conflict 
with any other felt desire. Thus, just as inference to the best explanation sometimes leads us to 
reject the way things seem to us in perceptual experience, similar considerations can lead us to 
call into question our felt desires in the practical domain. See Schafer(2013).
Fortunately, just as there is a connection between understanding and explanation, 
there also seems to be a connection between understanding and the ability to 
transcend our own particular subjective point of  view. Thus, the idea that rationality is 
a capacity for understanding can also help to explain the special rational status of  
being responsive to what others believe or will.  
There are a number of  ways of  approaching this point. For example, it seems that 
ideal understanding requires that one’s views and reasoning be potentially shareable. 
As Hills puts it, in order to understand that p is true because of  q, you must have 
certain capabilities - including capabilities that involve communication with others: 
If  you understand why p (and q is why p), then you judge that p and that q is 
why p and in the right sort of  circumstances you can successfully: (i) follow an 
explanation of  why p given by someone else (ii) explain why p in your own 
words (iii) draw the conclusion that p (or that probably p) from the 
information that q (iv) draw the conclusion that p’ (or that probably p’) from 
the information that q’ (where p’ and q’ are similar to but not identical to p and 
q) (v) given the information that p, give the right explanation, q; (vi) given the 
information that p’, give the right explanation, q’.  38
To have these capacities, we must reason in ways that are sensitive to whether other 
rational agents could share our reasoning. As a result, someone who aims at 
understanding will have priors that are “biased” towards intersubjective agreement. 
And this will make them responsive to the views of  other rational subjects, insofar as 
they are also engaged in the project of  developing shared understanding. So although 
testimony and deference to others are not particularly effective ways of  gaining 
genuine understanding, someone who is concerned with understanding will tend to be 
more responsive to testimony than they otherwise would be. In short, as Manne puts 
it, understanding seems to be the sort of  thing that it is not limited to any particular 
individual. Rather, it is the sort of  thing that should be achievable, not just by 
reasoning alone, but also by reasoning with other rational subjects. 
Obviously, this leaves many questions unanswered about exactly what sort of  
reasoning is required here. But what I want to stress here is the prima facie plausibility 
of  the idea that conceiving of  rationality as the capacity for understanding can help to 
explain the rational significance of  reasoning in an intersubjectively acceptable 
fashion.  Of  course, this is at most the beginning of  an account. But hopefully it will 39
give the reader some cause for cautious optimism about this project. 
5. Understanding, Rationality and Reasons 
 Hills(2009). For related ideas, see Manne(forthcoming), Markovits(2013), and Smith(2012).38
 Of  course, the degree to which this ideal is achievable will vary. Indeed, it is plausible that 39
there is a tension between the aim of  achieving this sort of  intersubjective understanding and 
the aim of  doing justice in that understanding to the diversity of  subjective points of  view. It is 
this tension, for example, that makes it plausible that our practical reasons involve both agent-
neutral reasons and agent-relative reasons in some form. See Nagel(1986) and 
Korsgaard(2008).
Given all this, to understand something is not just a matter of  getting it right. It also 
requires a systematic and explanatorily powerful understanding of  why things are as 
one takes them to be. In other words, it involves being in a position to give reasons 
for those thoughts - reasons that other rational subjects (at least in principle) can 
appreciate as valid. 
This is not meant as an exhaustive characterization of  the forms of  thought that 
constitute ideal understanding. For example, I have said little here about the role of  
experience or emotions or sensible desires, or of  empathy, or of  forms of  
interpretation that fit awkwardly with the model of  natural scientific understanding. 
Nor have I discussed other forms of  "anti-Cartesianism" about understanding - such 
as the idea that understanding might be "extended" to include, not just narrow mental 
states, but also bodily needs and capacities of  various kinds.  But I hope the two 40
cases discussed above have helped to indicate how a focus on understanding can 
expand our sense of  what rationality requires. 
I also hope this makes it more plausible that rationality in this sense has a constitutive 
connection with what we have reason to believe and do. After all, normative reasons 
just are considerations that play a justifying role. And while this point is not stressed 
enough, this justifying role involves more than merely "counting in favor" of  
something in a minimal sense.  Rather, to play this role, reasons must tap into some 41
more general understanding of  why something is to be believed or done - one that 
can be appreciated by other rational beings.  Thus, the sort of  systematic and 42
intersubjective justification involved in understanding also seems to be essential to our 
understanding of  what reasons are. This makes such a conception of  rationality a 
natural place for the constitutivist about reasons to begin. 
At the same time, the constraints that follow from the nature of  understanding and its 
implications for rationality will often be very abstract. For example, these constraints 
will demand that one reason in ways that give some sort of  priority to better 
explanations over worse. But this sort of  reasoning might take many forms - and 
which of  these forms is most appropriate for some agent might depend on their 
particular psychological capacities and cultural context. In this way, as Velleman nicely 
stresses, the sort of  rationality at issue here will be multiply realizable. And the forms 
it takes in one culture may be different from the forms it takes in another.  Thus, 43
what a particular individual has reason to do will be a function of  these general 
rational constraints as best realized in that individual's particular context. But at the same 
time, this does not mean that there are no interesting constraints that apply to all 
rational agents as such. For the nature of  understanding, while very abstract, does 
impose meaningful constraints of  this sort - even if  there are many ways for 
individuals and cultures to be true to them. 
6. Autonomy and Understanding  
 Seee Chalmers and Clark(2000). For discussion of  bodily needs see Manne(forthcoming).40
 Compare Scanlon(2013) and Parfit(2011).41
 Korsgaard(2009).42
 Velleman(2009).43
With this in mind, let’s return to the relationship between understanding-first 
constitutivism and autonomy-first constitutivism. As should be plain, the structure of  
these two views is very similar. Both views begin with a certain characterization of  my 
nature as a rational agent, which carries with it a conception of  my proper function or 
activity. And both use this function to derive further standards for action or thought 
via uncovering necessary conditions on autonomy or understanding, standards that in 
turn are used to explain what I have reason to believe or do. 
But I think these forms of  constitutivism are even more closely connected than this. 
One of  the striking things about our discussion of  rationality and understanding is 
that the constitutive standards that follow from this conception of  rationality are very 
similar to the standards that many autonomy-first constitutivists take to follow from 
the connection between agency and autonomy. For example, in a similar fashion, 
Korsgaard has argued that genuine autonomy requires both (i) a certain sort of  
systematicity in one's will and (ii) a sort of  transcendence of  one's personal 
perspective.  44
From a Kantian perspective, the convergence of  these views should actually be 
unsurprising. For it is a familiar Kantian point that achieving a unified perspective on 
the objects of  thought requires unifying the thoughts by which one represents those 
objects. If  this is right, then a certain sort of  "subjective unity" will be a necessary 
condition of  the "objective unity" that is characteristic of  understanding. And 
something like this "subjective unity" seems to be what many contemporary 
autonomy-first constitutivists have in mind when they discuss autonomy or self-
unification.  In this way, the understanding-first constitutivist may be able to derive 45
the claims of  the autonomy-first constitutivist as "subject-directed" corollaries of  
their "object-directed" claims about rationality and understanding.  
Nonetheless, I think constitutivism about reasons is most compelling when it begins 
with understanding as opposed to autonomy. In part, this is because I find the idea 
that understanding is essentially connected with explanation and intersubjectivity 
somewhat easier to grasp than the idea that autonomy has such connections. Thus, 
constitutivist arguments seems to me most compelling when they proceed from 
understanding as opposed to autonomy.  
But I also think that describing the constitutive aim or function of  rational thought in 
terms of  understanding the objects of  thought - as opposed to the autonomy or unity 
of  the thoughts themselves - better captures what matters to us from a first-person 
point of  view. After all, in both theoretical and practical reasoning, our primary 
concern is not the degree of  unity possessed by our thoughts themselves. Rather, our 
concern is with the objects we are thinking about. Thus, by characterizing the basic 
activity of  rational thought in terms of  understanding, we are truer to the "object-
directed" character of  rational thought. 
 Korsgaard(2009).44
 This helps to explain why self-consciousness is important for understanding - at least in the 45
Kantian sense of  self-consciousness in which an attitude is self-conscious just in case it is part 
of  the relevant "subjective unity".
This is relevant to the worry that this form of  constitutivism will do poorly at 
establishing the "first-person authority" of  the relevant constitutive standards. Given 
understanding-first constitutivism, we must comply with the standards constitutive of  
rationality, on pain of  a failure to understand. Similarly, given autonomy-first forms of  
constitutivism, we must comply with the standards constitutive of  agency, on pain of  
ceasing to be an agent in the full sense of  this term. In both cases, it is important to 
stress that this does not make it impossible to have doubts about the constitutive 
standards in question. It only indicates the costs associated with these doubts. Thus, 
from a structural perspective, these views involve similar forms of  "inescapability". 
The only question is which captures a deeper sort of  first-person inescapability.  46
And here it seems to me that the understanding-first constitutivist has the advantage 
over autonomy-first constitutivist. Quite simply, the "first-person authority" of  
understanding normally seems to me to be greater than the "first-person authority" of  
autonomy. Some evidence of  this can, I think, be seen from the reactions non-
Kantians often have to the significance that views like Korsgaard's attach to 
autonomy or self-unification.  But this idea gains support from the idea that fully 47
successful inquiry into a theoretical or practical question ends with understanding. If  
that is right, then to appreciate the connection between the nature of  inquiry and 
understanding, we need only to consider what it is for inquiry to succeed. 
Of  course, it may well that successful inquiry also terminates in a state of  mind that is 
autonomous in some sense. But it is the connection between inquiry and 
understanding that seems most straightforward from a first-person point of  view. 
Thus, if  we're looking for a constitutivism that provides us with "first-person 
inescapability", one that begins with understanding may be best placed to do so. 
 Enoch(2006.2011), Tiffany(2012).46
 See Gibbard(1999).47
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